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Static Analysis of The DeepSeek Android App
Abbey Imlay edited this page 2 months ago
I performed a fixed analysis of DeepSeek, townshipmarket.co.za a Chinese LLM chatbot, disgaeawiki.info using variation 1.8.0 from the Google Play Store. The goal was to identify potential security and privacy problems.
I've discussed DeepSeek formerly here.
Additional security and privacy concerns about DeepSeek have been raised.
See likewise this analysis by NowSecure of the iPhone version of DeepSeek
The findings detailed in this report are based purely on static analysis. This indicates that while the code exists within the app, valetinowiki.racing there is no definitive proof that all of it is carried out in practice. Nonetheless, the presence of such code warrants analysis, particularly provided the growing issues around information privacy, monitoring, the potential abuse of AI-driven applications, and cyber-espionage dynamics in between worldwide powers.
Key Findings
Suspicious Data Handling & Exfiltration
- Hardcoded URLs direct information to external servers, raising concerns about user activity monitoring, such as to ByteDance "volce.com" endpoints. NowSecure determines these in the iPhone app the other day also.
- Bespoke file encryption and data obfuscation techniques are present, with indications that they might be used to exfiltrate user details.
- The app contains hard-coded public keys, instead of depending on the user device's chain of trust.
- UI interaction tracking captures detailed user habits without clear consent.
- WebView adjustment exists, 35.237.164.2 which could permit the app to gain access to private external web browser information when links are opened. More details about WebView adjustments is here
Device Fingerprinting & Tracking
A substantial portion of the analyzed code appears to focus on event device-specific details, which can be utilized for tracking and fingerprinting.
- The app gathers different distinct device identifiers, consisting of UDID, Android ID, IMEI, IMSI, and carrier details. - System properties, set up packages, and root detection mechanisms suggest prospective anti-tampering measures. E.g. probes for the existence of Magisk, a tool that personal privacy supporters and security scientists utilize to root their Android gadgets.
- Geolocation and network profiling exist, prospective tracking abilities and allowing or disabling of fingerprinting regimes by area.
- Hardcoded device design lists recommend the application may act in a different way depending on the discovered hardware.
- Multiple vendor-specific services are utilized to extract extra device details. E.g. if it can not determine the gadget through basic Android SIM lookup (due to the fact that permission was not approved), it attempts maker specific extensions to access the very same details.
Potential Malware-Like Behavior
While no definitive conclusions can be drawn without dynamic analysis, numerous observed behaviors align with recognized spyware and malware patterns:
- The app uses reflection and UI overlays, which could facilitate unapproved screen capture or disgaeawiki.info phishing attacks. - SIM card details, serial numbers, and other device-specific data are aggregated for unidentified functions.
- The app carries out country-based gain access to constraints and "risk-device" detection, recommending possible monitoring mechanisms.
- The app executes calls to pack Dex modules, where extra code is loaded from files with a.so extension at runtime.
- The.so files themselves reverse and make extra calls to dlopen(), which can be utilized to load additional.so files. This center is not generally inspected by Google Play Protect and other fixed analysis services.
- The.so files can be carried out in native code, such as C++. Making use of native code includes a layer of complexity to the analysis procedure and obscures the full level of the app's capabilities. Moreover, native code can be leveraged to more quickly intensify advantages, potentially making use of vulnerabilities within the operating system or gadget hardware.
Remarks
While data collection prevails in modern applications for debugging and enhancing user experience, aggressive fingerprinting raises substantial personal privacy issues. The DeepSeek app requires users to visit with a valid email, which should already provide adequate authentication. There is no valid factor for asteroidsathome.net the app to aggressively collect and transfer special device identifiers, IMEI numbers, SIM card details, and other non-resettable system properties.
The degree of tracking observed here goes beyond common analytics practices, potentially making it possible for persistent user tracking and re-identification throughout gadgets. These behaviors, combined with obfuscation strategies and network interaction with third-party tracking services, call for a higher level of examination from security scientists and users alike.
The employment of runtime code loading along with the bundling of native code recommends that the app could permit the release and execution of unreviewed, from another location provided code. This is a serious possible attack vector. No evidence in this report is presented that remotely deployed code execution is being done, only that the facility for this appears present.
Additionally, the app's method to discovering rooted devices appears excessive for an AI chatbot. Root detection is typically justified in DRM-protected streaming services, where security and material protection are critical, or in competitive video games to avoid unfaithful. However, there is no clear rationale for such stringent measures in an application of this nature, raising further questions about its intent.
Users and organizations considering setting up DeepSeek must be mindful of these prospective dangers. If this application is being used within a business or government environment, additional vetting and security controls should be imposed before enabling its deployment on managed devices.
Disclaimer: The analysis provided in this report is based on static code evaluation and does not imply that all spotted functions are actively utilized. Further examination is needed for definitive conclusions.